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INTRODUCTION
In the recent and relatively unnoticed Sorrell v. IMS Health,
Inc.,1 the Supreme Court altered a long-established2 standard of
commercial speech3 jurisprudence. For more than three decades
leading up to Sorrell, First Amendment4 challenges to state regulation of commercial speech were subject to “intermediate-tier”
judicial scrutiny.5 The intermediate-tier standard acknowledged
that forms of speech proposing a commercial transaction deserved
at least some protection against state regulation, albeit secondary in
value to core “personal” speech afforded to individuals.6 Partly
because of its arguably higher “rank” in societal value, core “personal” speech is protected against governmental regulation on a
stringent “strict-scrutiny” basis.7 The government needs to justify
its restriction on personal speech by showing that the restriction
has a compelling purpose, and that the regulation is narrowly tai-

1

131 S. Ct. 2653 (2011).
See Jennifer L. Pomeranz, No Need To Break New Ground: A Response To The Supreme
Court’s Threat To Overhaul The Commercial Speech Doctrine, 45 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 389, 394
(2012) (“[I]t would be dangerous to depart from well-established precedent applying
intermediate protection to commercial speech . . . .”).
3
Famously defined as speech that does “no more than propose a commercial
transaction.” Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425
U.S. 748, 776 (1976) (Stewart, J., concurring).
4
U.S. CONST. amend. I (“Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of
speech. . . .”).
5
See, e.g., 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484, 501 (1996); Bd. of Trs.
of State Univ. of N.Y. v. Fox, 492 U.S. 469, 475 (1989); Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp.
v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n of N.Y., 447 U.S. 557, 564 (1980).
6
See generally Pomeranz, supra note 2, at 395. (“[A]t the core of the First Amendment
is the protection of ideas and most often takes the form of political and religious
speech.”). Professor Pomeranz quotes Justice Breyer: “Because virtually all human
interaction takes place through speech, the First Amendment cannot offer all speech the
same degree of protection. Rather, judges must apply different protective presumptions
in different contexts, scrutinizing government’s speech-related restrictions differently
depending upon the general category of activity.” Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 444
(Breyer, J., dissenting); see also Sorrell, 131 S. Ct. at 2674 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (“[O]ur
cases make clear that the First Amendment offers considerably less protection to the
maintenance of a free marketplace for goods and services.”).
7
The Court’s “strict scrutiny” analysis of governmental action is often heralded as
“strict in theory, fatal in fact.” See, e.g., Gerald Gunther, Foreword: In Search of Evolving
Doctrine on a Changing Court: A Model for Newer Equal Protection, 81 HARV. L. REV. 1, 8
(1972).
2
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lored to achieve that purpose.8 Meanwhile, in order to regulate or
restrict commercial speech, the government needs only to show
that the restriction directly advanced a “substantial” purpose, and,
more importantly, that the regulation was not “more extensive
than necessary” to serve that purpose. 9 In theory, this disparate
judicial treatment of core and commercial speech persists even after Sorrell: while states seeking to restrict various marketing or advertising techniques need to have a “substantial” reason for doing
so, it does not need to be “compelling.”
In practice, however, some have contended that the combination of Sorrell’s new “heightened judicial scrutiny” standard, along
with the increasingly business-friendly10 ideological makeup of the
Court, has pushed the standard towards a de facto strict scrutiny
standard.11 Critics believe that this is a mistake—there are substantive and important differences between core and commercial
speech, and a strict scrutiny standard would blur those differences,
in effect demeaning the higher-value personal speech in the
process.12 Others see no reason for a different standard of scrutiny
at all.13 Yet the confusion surrounding the new Sorrell standard,
along with Justice Kennedy’s own application of Central Hudson,
has made lower courts very cautious in abandoning, or even altering, the established intermediate-tier analysis.14

8

See, e.g., Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 407 (1989) (striking down Texas statute
criminalizing the desecration of the American Flag); Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444,
447–48 (1969) (holding that racist political speech by Ku Klux Klan member is protected
under the First Amendment).
9
See, e.g., Cent. Hudson, 447 U.S. at 564–66.
10
See Adam Liptak, Pro-Business Decisions Are Defining This Supreme Court, N.Y.
TIMES, May 4, 2013, http://www.nytimes.com/2013/05/05/business/pro-businessdecisions-are-defining-this-supreme-court.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0.
11
See, e.g., Samantha Rauer, When The First Amendment and Public Health Collide: The
Court’s Increasingly Strict Constitutional Scrutiny of Health Regulations That Restrict
Commercial Speech, 38 AM. J. L. & MED. 690, 691 (2012) (“Despite the conceptualization
of Central Hudson as an intermediate standard, when examining public health regulations,
the Court has been increasingly strict in its level of scrutiny.”).
12
See Pomeranz, supra note 2, at 391–412.
13
See generally Alex Kozinski & Stuart Banner, Who’s Afraid of Commercial Speech?, 76
VA. L. REV. 627 (1990) (arguing that the distinction between commercial and
noncommercial speech does not warrant divergent levels of constitutional protection).
14
See infra notes 100–04.
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This Note argues that until the Court sets forth a clear standard
of analysis for its “heightened judicial scrutiny” language, traditional intermediate-tier review will prevail. Although the court may
have, over the years, established a de facto strict scrutiny standard,
it has not done so explicitly. Nor have lower courts struck down
public health regulations merely due to the fact that the regulations
did not pass “heightened judicial scrutiny”; in fact, after Sorrell,
the fate of almost every commercial speech restriction evaluated by
a lower court has come down to whether it passed Central Hudson,
not the new Sorrell standard.15 This makes sense. If the Sorrell
Court wanted the constitutional inquiry to end upon a determination that a regulation was discriminatory based on content or speakership, it probably would have said so. Instead, Justice Kennedy
opted to take a more familiar path and applied the intermediate-tier
standard anyway.
Part I of this Note outlines the modern commercial speech doctrine, including the applicability of the Central Hudson standard to
public health regulation. Part II will discuss the facts and relatively
novel legal standards introduced in Sorrell, as well as provide an
analysis of Justice Kennedy’s majority opinion. It will also discuss
and analyze Justice Breyer’s intense dissent from Justice Kennedy’s opinion, including his sensitive accusation of the Court wading into Lochner16-era jurisprudence. It will finally summarize how
Sorrell has changed, if at all, the evaluation of various public health
regulations within the lower courts. Part III will gauge the reaction
to Sorrell, and any impact the majority decision may bring to future
evaluation of commercial speech regulation. Finally, in Part IV, I
will conclude by arguing that in the absence of a clear mandate for
strict scrutiny, lower courts should not treat Sorrell’s new “heightened judicial scrutiny” standard as dispositive, and opt instead for
the traditional and familiar intermediate-tier analysis.

15
16

Id.
See Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
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I. THE MODERN COMMERCIAL SPEECH DOCTRINE
Ever since the Court overruled17 Valentine v. Chrestensen,18 thus
granting commercial speech First Amendment protection,19 courts
have had to decide the extent to which governmental regulation
can restrict such speech in the name of public health. The landmark Central Hudson Gas & Electric. Corp. v. Public Service Commission of New York20 established a four-pronged, intermediate scrutiny standard21 for analyzing the constitutionality of such regulation.22 This framework technically23 remains the standard by which
the Court evaluates public health regulations that infringe on
commercial speech rights.24
Nonetheless, commentators note that the Central Hudson intermediate-tier standard itself can be a very tough one for the government to meet.25 In fact, the Court has not upheld a commercial
17

See Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748
(1976).
18
316 U.S. 52 (1942) (upholding a municipal ban on distributing advertisements in the
streets, and more broadly holding that commercial speech is not protected under the First
Amendment).
19
See Va. State Bd. Of Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 761.
20
447 U.S. 557, 558 (1980) (striking down a New York state regulation banning utility
companies from advertising their services).
21
First, the speech cannot be false or misleading, and it must not promote unlawful
activity. Id. at 563–64. Second, the government must have a “substantial interest” in
regulation the speech. Id. at 564. Third, the regulation must “directly advance” that
interest. Id. And finally, the restriction on speech cannot be “more extensive than
necessary” to serve this interest. Id.
22
Id. at 557–58, 561. The Court held that the State had a substantial interest in energy
conservation and making sure that utility rates were “fair and efficient” (prong 2). The
restriction also “directly advanced” that interest (prong 3). Nonetheless, an outright ban
on advertising was “more extensive than necessary.” Id. at 571–72. The State, according
to the Court, could have considered less drastic alternatives, such as adjusting “the
format and content of . . . advertising,” or forcing the disclosure of “relative efficiency
and expense” of information. Id. at 571.
23
Though the Central Hudson framework has survived Sorrell, see infra discussion on
how Sorrell adds a separate “heightened judicial scrutiny” analysis regarding content and
speaker neutrality.
24
See, e.g., Sorrell v. IMS Health, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2653, 2667–68 (2011); 44 Liquormart,
Inc. v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484, 504–06 (1996).
25
See, e.g., Luke Dawson, A Spoonful of Free Speech Helps The Medicine Go Down: OffLabel Speech & The First Amendment, 99 IOWA L. REV. 803, 815 (2014) (“[T]oday, Central
Hudson imposes a heavy burden on the government.”); Rauer, supra note 11 at 691
(“Despite the conceptualization of Central Hudson as an intermediate standard, when
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speech restriction in almost two decades.26 The fourth Central
Hudson requirement, that the regulation cannot be “more extensive than necessary,” can be particularly lethal.27 The Court has
had little trouble striking down regulations they deemed to be more
extensive than necessary to achieve the government’s purpose. In
2002, for instance, the Court struck down a federal ban on the advertisement of compounded drugs by various pharmacies.28 The
Court held that although the government had a “substantial interest” in generally promoting public health and safety, and that the
examining public health regulations, the Court has been increasingly strict in its level of
scrutiny.”).
26
Pomeranz, supra note 2, at 391 (citing Fla. Bar v. Went For It, Inc., 515 U.S. 618
(1995) (upholding a state bar rule that imposed a thirty-day ban on targeted direct mail
solicitations of persons involved in personal injury or wrongful death actions)).
27
See, e.g., 44 Liquormart, 517 U.S. at 507 (pl. opinion) (striking down a prohibition on
advertising the price of alcoholic beverages in part because “alternative forms of
regulation that would not involve any restriction on speech would be more likely to
achieve the State’s goal of promoting temperance”); Rubin v. Coors Brewing Co., 514
U.S. 476, 490–91 (1995) (striking down prohibition on beer labels displaying alcohol
content in part because of the availability of alternatives “such as directly limiting the
alcohol content of beers, prohibiting marketing efforts emphasizing high alcohol
strength . . . or limiting the labeling ban only to malt liquors”); Zauderer v. Office of
Disciplinary Counsel of Supreme Court of Ohio, 471 U.S. 626, 647 (1985) (striking down
a blanket ban on illustrations in advertisements for attorneys); Robert Post, Prescribing
Records and the First Amendment—New Hampshire’s Data-Mining Statute, 360 NEW ENG.
J. MED. 745, 747 (2009) (“This last requirement is so arbitrary that it constitutes an open
invitation for judges to bring political prejudices to bear in resolving cases. Antiregulatory
judges will tend to strike down statutes on the basis of this requirement; proregulatory
judges will tend to uphold them.”). But see Bd. of Trs. of State Univ. of N.Y. v. Fox, 492
U.S. 469, 477 (1989) (holding that governmental restrictions upon commercial speech
need not be the absolute least restrictive means to achieve desired end); San Francisco
Arts & Athletics, Inc. v. U.S. Olympic Comm., 483 U.S. 522, 534–35 (1987) (upholding
Olympic Committee’s right to enforce its trademark in the word ‘Olympics’ against a gay
rights group’s promotion of the “Gay Olympic Games.”); Posadas de Puerto Rico
Assocs. v. Tourism Co. of Puerto Rico, 478 U.S. 328, 338-39 (1986) (upholding blanket
ban on gambling casino advertising); Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass’n, 436 U.S. 447, 456
(1978) (upholding regulation of commercial activity deemed harmful to the public even if
speech is a component of that activity).
28
See Thompson v. W. States Med. Ctr., 535 U.S. 357, 360 (2002). Drugs are
“compounded” when their ingredients are mixed and tailored to the needs of specific
patients. Id. at 357. They are exempted from having to obtain FDA approval because of
such particularized need. Id. at 360–61. The regulation was not a “blanket ban” because
exemption from the FDA approval process was itself conditioned on refraining from
commercial speech. Providers could still advertise should they choose to go through the
approval process. Rauer, supra note 11, at 696.
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ban “directly advanced” that interest, the government still failed
to show that there weren’t alternative ways to advance its goals
without infringing on the speech of the pharmacies.29 In fact, Justice O’Connor went so far as to suggest that if the Court itself could
identify less restrictive means of achieving the government’s ends,
the regulation could be found to be too restrictive (emphasis added).30
Indeed, the modern Court has developed a relatively consistent
pattern of striking down public health regulations abridging commercial speech, with much of the Court’s analysis focusing on how
narrowly tailored the regulations are to the purported interests at
stake. Blanket bans on advertising, as seen in Central Hudson and
44 Liquormart,31 deserved “special care”32 because they tended to
over-inclusively ban entire categories of speech. Yet the Court has
treated even more narrowly tailored regulations negatively as well.
In Lorilland Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, for instance, the Court invalidated
two Massachusetts regulations prohibiting the advertising of
smokeless tobacco (a) within 1000 feet of a school or playground
and (b) lower than five feet from the floor of a store located within
1000 feet of a school or playground.33 A highly splintered Court
conceded that although these regulations did not amount to a blanket ban, they were more extensive that necessary nonetheless, even
29

Thompson, 535 U.S. at 371 (“Assuming it is true that drugs cannot be marketed on a
large scale without advertising, the FDAMA’s prohibition on advertising compounded
drugs might indeed ‘directly advanc[e]’ the Government’s interests.”). Justice
O’Connor listed a few examples of less restrictive regulations to advance the
government’s interests in public health and safety: for one, the government could have
merely banned the use of commercial scale manufacturing or testing equipment for
compounding drugs. Id. at 372. It could have prohibited pharmacists from “[o]ffering
compounded drug products at wholesale to other state licensed persons or commercial
entities for resale.” Id. (citation omitted). It could have also “limit[ed] the amount of
compounded drugs, either by volume or by numbers of prescriptions, that a given
pharmacist or pharmacy sells out of state.” Id. (citation omitted).
30
See Dawson, supra note 25, at 815 (citing Thompson, 535 U.S. at 372 (“Another
possibility not suggested by the Guide would be capping the amount of any particular
compounded drug, either by drug volume, number of prescriptions, gross revenue, or
profit that a pharmacist or pharmacy may make or sell in a given period of time.”)).
31
See 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484, 500, 505–07 (1996) (striking
down Rhode Island liquor advertisement ban for not promoting the State’s interest in
promoting temperance and being more extensive than necessary.).
32
Id. “Special care” in this case means more stringent scrutiny.
33
See 533 U.S. 525, 525 (2001).
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if the State’s interest in discouraging and preventing youth tobacco
use was compelling.34 The statute invalidated in Thompson also did
not include a blanket ban, instead only restricting advertising for
compounding drugs that did not go through FDA approval.35 The
Court’s hostile treatment of even relatively narrowly tailored public health regulation has drawn repeated critiques of the Central
Hudson standard itself.36 Some allege that the test’s fourth prong
essentially pushes the standard of review from intermediate to
strict scrutiny.37 Others, like Justice Thomas, would overturn Central Hudson altogether and protect commercial speech at the same
strict scrutiny standard afforded to personal speech.38
34

Id. at 542. The Court found that the regulation was more extensive than necessary
because there was evidence that the Attorney General did not “carefully calculat[e] the
costs and benefits associated with the burden on speech imposed.” Id. at 528 (citing
Cincinnati v. Discovery Network, Inc., 507 U.S. 410 (1993)).
35
See Thompson v. W. States Med. Ctr., 535 U.S. 357, 361-63 (2002). The government
argued that because compounded drugs were designed to meet unique, individualized
needs, restrictions on their advertisements served substantial governmental interests in
public health and safety. Id. at 368. The Court nonetheless concluded that because the
government did not even consider less restrictive alternatives, the statute abridged speech
more extensively than necessary. Id. at 373 (“If the First Amendment means anything, it
means that regulating speech must be a last—not first—resort. Yet here it seems to have
been the first strategy the Government thought to try.”).
36
See Rauer, supra note 11, at 693 (citing Robert Post, The Constitutional Status of
Commercial Speech, 48 UCLA L. REV. 1 (2000) (arguing that the Central Hudson test is
abstract and unhelpful)); Brian J. Waters, A Doctrine in Disarray: Why the First
Amendment Demands the Abandonment of the Central Hudson Test for Commercial Speech,
27 SETON HALL L. REV. 1626 (1997) (critiquing the test’s uneven application, which
results in “confusing jurisprudence”); Tamara R. Piety, “A Necessary Cost of Freedom”?
The Incoherence of Sorrell v. IMS, 64 ALA. L. REV. 1, 4 (2012) (arguing that attacks on
Central Hudson for the most part urge the Court not to go back to the Cherstensen
doctrine, but rather to “eliminate commercial speech’s purportedly ‘second-class citizen’
status and to offer it full First Amendment protection”).
37
See Rauer, supra note 11, at 692–93 (“Public health regulations subjected to the
Central Hudson analysis are almost always invalidated. Although the government has
attempted to more narrowly tailor its legislative means to substantial interests, the Court
consistently fails to find that even the more narrowly-tailored regulations can satisfy . . .
the Central Hudson standard.”).
38
See 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484, 522 (1996) (Thomas, J.,
concurring) (arguing that there is no “philosophical or historical basis for asserting that
‘commercial’ speech is of ‘lower value’ than ‘noncommercial’ speech”); Kozinski &
Banner, supra note 13, at 634 (“The first amendment’s text and history don’t provide us
with any explanation of the distinction between commercial and noncommercial
speech.”).
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II. SORRELL AND THE ROAD TO STRICT SCRUTINY
Although Justice Thomas’ concurrence in 44 Liquormart may
have seemed outlandish at the time, the recent and relatively unnoticed Sorrell v. IMS Health may have moved the evaluation of public health regulation of commercial speech ever closer to a strict
scrutiny standard.39
In Sorrell, the Court considered whether a Vermont law curbing a drug company’s ability to solicit physician prescriptions violated the company’s First Amendment rights to truthful and lawful commercial speech.40 In enacting the Prescription Confidentiality Law (known as Act 80), Vermont sought to limit a marketing
practice by pharmaceutical companies called “detailing.” “Detailing” is when a sales representative for a pharmaceutical company
(a “detailer”) visits a doctor’s office in order to persuade the doctor to prescribe a particular pharmaceutical.41 Pharmaceutical sales
agents are much more successful in their marketing efforts if they
receive “prescriber-identifying information” (PII)42 before visiting
a doctor’s office. PII is invaluable to pharmaceutical companies because it allows detailers to quickly target doctors most willing to
purchase their drug.43 How do pharmaceutical companies get this
information? In Sorrell, they bought it from pharmacies that were,
by Vermont law, required to receive and record PII when
processing prescriptions.44 Most pharmacies then elect to sell the
PII to “data miners,”45 who in turn produce reports on physicians’
prescribing “behavior.”46 Pharmaceutical companies then buy
these reports in order to refine their marketing tactics and increase
sales.47
39

131 S. Ct. 2653 (2011).
Id.
41
Id. at 2659. (“Detailers bring drug samples as well as medical studies that explain the
‘details’ and potential advantages of various prescription drugs.”).
42
PII is incredibly valuable because it gives the detailer specific knowledge (“details”)
of a physician’s prescription patterns. Id.
43
Id. at 2659–60.
44
Id. at 2660.
45
Or: firms that analyze prescriber-identifying information and produce reports on
prescriber information.
46
Id. at 2656.
47
Id. at 2660.
40
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The main provision of Vermont’s Act 80, § 4631(d),48 did
three things: first, it banned pharmacies (among others) from selling PII, absent the prescriber’s consent. Second, it banned pharmacies (among others) from allowing PII to be used for “marketing,”49 unless the prescriber consented, which in effect barred
pharmacies from disclosing the information for marketing purposes
at all.50 Finally, and most importantly, it outlawed pharmaceutical
companies specifically from using PII for marketing, absent the
prescriber’s consent.51 These prohibitions were subject to a few
exemptions. For instance, PII could have been disseminated or
used for “health care research”; to enforce “compliance” with
health insurance formularies or preferred drug lists; for “educational communications” provided to patients for “treatment options”; for law enforcement operations; and for purposes “otherwise provided by law.”52 Finally, the Act also created a drugeducation program, designed to “counter-detail,” or persuade doctors to prescribe generic drugs, instead of costlier brand-name
drugs.53 As such, counter-detailers could use PII, but regular detailers could not.54
A. Sorrell: Majority Analysis
The first and perhaps most contentious part of Justice Kennedy’s majority opinion went beyond the typical Central Hudson
analysis. Indeed, unlike almost any commercial speech case preced-

48

VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 4631(d) (West 2010) (“[A] pharmacy . . . shall not sell,
license, or exchange for value regulated records containing prescriber-identifiable
information, nor permit the use of regulated records containing prescriber-identifiable
information for marketing or promoting a prescription drug, unless the prescriber
consents . . . . Pharmaceutical manufacturers and pharmaceutical marketers shall not use
prescriber-identifiable information for marketing or promoting a prescription drug unless
the prescriber consents.”).
49
Sorrell, 131 S. Ct. at 2660. “Marketing” is defined in the Act as including
“advertising, promotion or any activity” that is “used to influence sales or market share
of a prescription drug.” Id.
50
Id.
51
Id.
52
Id. (citing § 4631(e) of the Act).
53
Id. at 2661.
54
Id.
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ing Sorrell,55 Justice Kennedy began his analysis by discussing how
Act 80 on its face implemented speech restrictions based on the
content of the speech and the identity of the speaker.56 The provision’s exceptions allowed those in “educational capacities” to purchase and use PII, while prohibiting pharmacies and pharmaceutical companies from doing the same for marketing purposes. The
Court held that this was discrimination based on the speaker.
Moreover, because the Act prohibited the purchase of PII for the
specific purpose of directly marketing brand name pharmaceuticals, the statute thus “disfavored” speech with a particular content.57
Unequivocally and forcefully, Justice Kennedy held that
“heightened judicial scrutiny” is warranted whenever a “contentbased burden” is imposed on commercial speech.58 As stressed by
Richard Samp, the adoption of the “heightened” scrutiny standard
had never been applied in a commercial speech case, although
Kennedy suggests otherwise.59 Kennedy cites Court precedent60 to
55

Richard Samp, Sorrell v. IMS Health: Protecting Free Speech Or Resurrecting Lochner?,
2011 CATO SUP. CT. REV. 129, 133 (2011) (“Although the majority suggested that
‘heightened’ scrutiny had been applied in previous commercial speech cases involving
content-based speech restrictions, none of the cases cited by the majority were
commercial speech cases.”).
56
See Sorrell, 131 S. Ct. at 2663. (“On its face, Vermont’s law enacts content and
speaker-based restrictions on the sale, disclosure, and use of prescriber-identifying
information. The provision first forbids the sale subject to exception based in large part of
the content of a purchaser’s speech. For example, those wish to engage in certain
‘educational communications’ may purchase the information. The measure then bars any
disclosure when recipient speakers will use the information for marketing. Finally, the
provision’s second sentence prohibits pharmaceutical manufacturers from using the
information for marketing. The statute thus disfavors marketing, that is, speech with a
particular content. More than that, the statute disfavors specific speakers, namely
pharmaceutical manufacturers.”). As Jennifer Pomeranz points out, the respondents’
brief urged the Court to adopt Justice Thomas’ strict scrutiny standard for all forms of
speech, whether commercial or personal. Pomeranz, supra note 2, at 393 (citing Brief for
Plaintiffs-Appellants, at 23 (“Justice Thomas repeatedly has called for abandonment of
intermediate scrutiny ‘[i]n cases such as this, in which the government’s asserted interest
is to keep legal users of a product or service ignorant in order to manipulate their choices
in the marketplace.’ Publishers agree with this reasoning . . . .”) (citations omitted))).
57
Sorrell, 131 S. Ct. at 2663. It’s not clearly established whether either content-based or
speaker-based statutory language triggers “heightened judicial scrutiny,” or whether both
are necessary.
58
Id. at 2664.
59
Samp, supra note 55, at 133; Sorrell, 131 S. Ct. at 2663–64.
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support his contention that content and speaker-based governmental regulation deserves a stricter scrutiny analysis, even in a purely
commercial speech context.61 Yet almost none of these cases involved public health regulation of commercial speech, and in none
of those decisions did the Court “suggest that its call for heightened scrutiny extended to commercial speech cases.”62 In fact, the
only commercial speech case that considered a regulation’s content
neutrality, Cincinnati v. Discovery Network, Inc.,63 did not, contrary
to Kennedy’s assertion, apply his so-called “heightened scrutiny”
standard. It applied Central Hudson, and Justice Stevens’ opinion
explicitly rejected having to decide whether a more exacting scrutiny should be applied to content or speaker-based regulations.64 In
Sorrell, Justice Kennedy may well have decided for us.65
Yet even after strongly implying that a public health regulation’s content and speaker-based discrimination were enough to
60

E.g., United States v. Playboy Entm’t Group, Inc., 529 U.S. 803 (2000) (striking
down a section of federal statute prohibiting cable stations from providing sexually
explicit programming except during late-night hours); Turner Broad. Sys. Inc. v. FCC,
512 U.S. 622 (1994) (upholding federal “must-carry” statute requiring cable service
operators to carry the signals of over-the-air television stations); Simon & Schuster, Inc.
v. Member of N.Y. State Crime Victims Bd., 502 U.S. 105 (1991) (striking down New
York’s “Son of Sam” laws prohibiting convicted criminals from profiting off of books
published about their crimes).
61
Sorrell, 131 S. Ct. at 2663–66.
62
Samp, supra note 55, at 134 (“In noncommercial speech cases, the issue of
‘heightened’ scrutiny usually arises in the context of determining whether time-place-ormanner doctrine applies to a challenged speech restriction.”); Pomeranz, supra note 2, at
391 (“[T]he majority departed from precedent establishing the commercial speech
doctrine and confusingly infused core speech cases within its proposed commercial
speech analysis.”).
63
507 U.S. 410 (1993) (striking down Cincinnati’s ban on the distribution of a
particular magazine from newsracks located on public property).
64
Id. at 416 n.11 (“Because we conclude that Cincinnati’s ban on commercial
newsracks cannot withstand scrutiny under Central Hudson and Fox, we need not decide
whether that policy should be subjected to more exacting review.”).
65
See Samp, supra note 55, at 135 (“Sorrell’s assertion that ‘heightened’ scrutiny
applies to any content-based burdens imposed on speech, even when the speech is
commercial in nature, suggests that the Court may be contemplating a substantial
expansion of First Amendment protection for commercial speech.”); see also Sorrell, 131
S. Ct. at 2667 (“In the ordinary case it is all but dispositive to conclude that law is
content-based and, in practice, viewpoint-discriminatory.”) (citing R.A.V. v. St. Paul in
supporting the contention that “content-based regulations are presumptively invalid.”
505 U.S. 377, 391–92 (1992)).
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presumptively invalidate the law, Justice Kennedy proceeded to
evaluate Act 80 under Central Hudson anyway.66 First, because the
regulation targeted truthful speech with respect to a legal activity
(“detailing”), the first Central Hudson prong was not relevant.67
The Court thus evaluated whether Vermont “directly advance[d] a
substantial governmental interest and that the measure [was]
drawn to achieve that interest.”68 Vermont’s purported interests in
the Act were twofold: first, it was necessary to protect a physician’s reasonable expectation of privacy, including his or her confidentiality, avoidance of harassment, and the integrity of the doctorpatient relationship.69 Second, the Act was said to be integral for
public policy objectives, particularly to improve overall public
health and lower healthcare costs.70
The Court was not persuaded, holding that neither reason,
even if substantial, was sufficient to survive the intermediate tier
standard.71 In addressing the State’s privacy argument, the Court
held that the Act’s broad exemptions (i.e., for “educational communications”) permitted widespread distribution of PII, thus undermining (and not “directly advancing”) the State’s interest in
protecting physician confidentiality.72 While Kennedy suggested
66

Sorrell, 131 S. Ct. at 2667 (arguing that the outcome would be the same “whether a
special commercial speech inquiry or a stricter form of judicial scrutiny applied”); see also
Greater New Orleans Broadcasting Ass’n, Inc. v. United States, 527 U.S. 173, 184
(1999)). Yet, again, nowhere in the Greater New Orleans case—which struck down a
regulation banning advertising of legal gambling—did the Court condone a “stricter form
of judicial scrutiny” than Central Hudson. See Greater New Orleans, 527 U.S. at 184 (“In
this case, there is no need to break new ground. Central Hudson, as applied in our more
recent commercial speech cases, provides an adequate basis for decision.”). Nor did the
Court equate a more stringent “heightened scrutiny” standard with the Central Hudson
test, as Kennedy blankly states. See id. Still, Kennedy’s formulation raises the obvious
question: if the outcome is the same regardless of the standard applied, then why
introduce a brand new standard into the commercial speech doctrine at all?
67
See Samp, supra note 55, at 132.
68
Sorrell, 131 S. Ct. at 2667–68 (citations omitted).
69
Id. at 2668.
70
Id.
71
See id.
72
Id. (“The explicit structure of the statute allows the information to be studied and
used by all but a narrow class of disfavored speakers. Given the information’s widespread
availability and many permissible uses, the State’s asserted interest in physician
confidentiality does not justify the burden that § 4631(d) places on protected
expression.”)
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the possibility that data-mining presented “serious and unresolved
issues with respect to personal privacy and the dignity it seeks to
secure,”73 Vermont still could not engage in “content-based discrimination to advance its own side of a debate.”74 And while the
first rationale (privacy) failed the third Central Hudson prong, the
second rationale (public health) failed the fourth. The Court held
that even if Vermont’s interests in improving public health and reducing health costs were substantial, Act 80 did not advance those
interests “in a permissible way.”75 Justice Kennedy held that a
state may never justify regulating truthful commercial speech based
on a fear of how people may react to the speech.76 In other words,
Vermont may not regulate truthful speech by detailers out of fear
that successful marketing of that speech would lead physicians and
consumers to purchase their products. This was especially true,
Kennedy stressed, when the targets of the marketing, physicians,
were “sophisticated and experienced consumers.”77 The majority
concluded that although some restrictions on commercial speech
or conduct are permissible under the First Amendment, when a
statute imposes “more than an incidental burden on protected expression” and does so based on the content of the speech or identity of the speaker, it will be subject to “heightened scrutiny.”78 So
without explicitly abandoning the Central Hudson approach, the
Court has adopted an additional standard of analysis for laws burdening commercial speech. This additional “judicial scrutiny”
standard does not attach an evaluative level of scrutiny, which, as
seen later on in this section, will drive lower courts to fall back on
Central Hudson as the dispositive test.

73

Id. at 2672.
Id.
75
Id. at 2670.
76
Id. at 2670-71 (“The First Amendment directs us to be especially skeptical of
regulations that seek to keep people in the dark for what the government perceives to be
their own good . . . . The State can express its views through its own speech . . . But a
State’s failure to persuade does not allow it to hamstring its opposition. The State may
not burden the speech of others in order to tilt public debate in a preferred direction.”
(citing Thompson v. W. States Med. Ctr., 535 U.S. 357, 374 (2002)).
77
Sorrell, 131 S. Ct. at 2671.
78
Id. at 2664; see also Samp, supra note 55, at 139.
74
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B. Breyer’s Dissent: Creeping Toward Lochner
In a searing dissent, Justice Breyer stressed that the problem
was not about a burden on corporate speech, but rather commercial
conduct.79 He argued that the Court, in deference to legislative
judgment, has traditionally applied a very lenient standard to regulating ordinary commercial transactions80 indirectly affecting
speech.81 In doing so, he warned the Court about wading into Lochner82 waters (though using the First Amendment instead of the
Fourteenth) to evade a rational basis standard when evaluating
“ordinary economic regulatory programs.”83 Furthermore, al79
Indeed, as various commentators have pointed out, the sale of prescription patterns
and practices by physicians does not automatically make one think of a speech issue. See
Rauer, supra note 11, at 709 (citing Brief For New England Journal of Medicine et al. as
Amici Curae Supporting Petitioners (arguing that selling private health information is not
about speech, but privacy and confidentiality)).
80
See United States v. Carolene Prods. Inc., 304 U.S. 144, 152 (“[R]egulatory
legislation affecting ordinary commercial transactions is not to be pronounced
unconstitutional unless . . . it is of such a character as to preclude the assumption that it
rests upon some rational basis within the knowledge and experience of the legislators.”);
see also id. at n.4 (“[P]rejudice against discrete and insular minorities may be a special
condition, which tends seriously to curtail the operation of those political processes
ordinarily to be relied upon to protect minorities . . . may call for a correspondingly more
searching judicial inquiry.”).
81
Sorrell, 131 S. Ct. at 2675 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (“‘Our function’ in such cases,
Justice Brandeis said, ‘is only to determine the reasonableness of the legislature’s belief in
the existence of evils and in the effectiveness of the remedy provided.’” (quoting New
States Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 286–87 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting))).
82
See Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 59 (1905). Lochner v. New York was a
landmark case in which the Court struck down a New York statute maximizing the
number of hours worked by bakers because the statute violated a “freedom to contract”
implicit in the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Id. The ruling was
seen by many as the highlight of an era in which state laws regulating ordinary commercial
conduct were struck down as unconstitutional, leading many to accuse the Court of
“judicial activism.” See Stephen Gardbaum, New Deal Constitutionalism and the
Unshackling of the States, 64 U. CHI. L. REV. 483, 493 (1997) (attacking the decision as
“illegitimate judicial activism”).
83
See Sorrell, 131 S. Ct. at 2675 (“To apply a strict First Amendment standard virtually
as a matter of course when a court reviews ordinary economic regulatory programs (even
if that program has a modest impact upon a firm’s ability to shape a commercial message)
would work at cross-purposes with this more basic constitutional approach.”). Breyer
also cited Justice Rehnquist’s dissent in Central Hudson, predicting that judges would use
the standard to effectuate a “return to the bygone era of Lochner v. New York, in which it
was common practice for this Court to strike down economic regulations adopted by a
State based on the Court’s own notions of the most appropriate means for the State to
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though the action at hand did implicate the regulation of corporate
speech, Breyer stressed that while commercial speech has an “informational function” and is not “valueless” in the marketplace of
ideas,84 it is still afforded much less judicial scrutiny than “highervalue” social and political speech at the core of First Amendment
protection.
C. The Glickman Analysis
Throughout his dissent Breyer made repeated references to
another commercial speech case, Glickman v. Wileman Bros. & Elliot, Inc.,85 which he felt was more similar to the case at hand. In
Glickman, a group of fruit growers challenged regulations by the
Department of Agriculture requiring them to collectively pay for
the advertising and marketing of their products.86 The issue in the
case was the standard of review afforded to the regulations. The
Ninth Circuit, in striking down the requirements, applied the traditional intermediate-tier standard (Central Hudson) because it believed that the regulation infringed on the growers’ First Amendment right to market their own products.87 The rule was struck
down on Central Hudson’s fourth prong, holding that the government failed to prove that collective advertising was a better alternative to the government’s purported interest behind the regulation—increasing consumer demand in tree fruits—than allowing
the growers to market their products themselves.88 The Supreme
Court, with Justice Kennedy in the majority, overruled the Ninth
Circuit on a 5–4 vote, holding that not only does the regulation not
violate the First Amendment, but that it was a mistake to apply
Central Hudson altogether, opting instead for the low-tier rationalbasis test afforded to ordinary economic regulation.89

implement its considered policies.” Id. (citing Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub
Serv. Comm’n of N.Y., 447 U.S. 557, 589 (1980) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting)).
84
Sorrell, 131 S. Ct. at 2674 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (citing Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at
563; Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 U.S. 809, 826 (1975)).
85
521 U.S. 457 (1997).
86
Id. at 460.
87
Id. at 457.
88
Id. at 458.
89
Id.
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The Glickman Court held that three characteristics of the generic advertising scheme distinguished it from laws the Court had
found to abridge free speech. First, the marketing orders imposed
no restraint on the respondents’ freedom to communicate any
message to any audience. Second, they did not compel anyone to
engage in any actual or symbolic speech. Third, they did not compel anyone to endorse or finance any political or ideological
views.90 Would Sorrell have turned the other way had Glickman
analysis been applied? Breyer suggests Glickman (and thus, a rational-basis test) should have applied here,91 and that neither Central Hudson nor “heightened scrutiny” analyses were appropriate92
because § 4631(d) was part of Vermont’s “traditional, comprehensive regulatory regime.”93 Further, Breyer pointed out that because
PII in itself was the result of Vermont’s requirement for pharmacies
to maintain a “patient record system” (and thus a state-created
right), the state should have logically been able to “create tailored
restrictions” on its use.94
Yet it is not clear (or at least not as clear as Breyer may have
conveyed) that the Act could have even passed the three Glickman
prongs in the first place. With respect to the first prong, Act 80
does seem to restrain (at least somewhat) the respondents’ freedom to communicate with their target audience.95 Nonetheless, it
is true, as Breyer points out, that the Act only bans them from selling and using PII without the physician’s consent, and not entirely.96
Further, the pharmaceutical companies themselves do not need PII
to market their drugs, so Act 80 does not “impose a restraint,” or
at least an insurmountable restraint, on their freedom to communi90

Id.
See Sorrell v. IMS Health, 131 S. Ct. 2563, 2676 (2011) (applying Glickman’s three
factors to the facts at hand, “Vermont’s state neither forbids nor requires anyone to say
anything, to engage in any form of symbolic speech, or to endorse any particular point of
view, whether ideological or related to the sale of a product.”).
92
Even though he ended up applying Central Hudson nonetheless. See id. at 2679–80;
see also infra note 97 (summarizing Breyer’s Central Hudson analysis).
93
Sorrell, 131 S. Ct. at 2676.
94
Id. As an example, he cites a federal statute (15 U.S.C. § 1681(b)) prohibiting car
dealerships from using existing customers’ credit scores to search for new customers.
95
The respondents could even argue that the Act would deprive them of reaching their
target audience at all.
96
VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 4631 (d) (West 2010).
91
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cate their message to their audience. Second, the Act does not
compel the respondents to do engage in actual or symbolic
speech—rather, the statute is purely a restrictive measure. However, the third prong may also be problematic because the Act does
seem to favor non-for-profit “counter-detailers” using PII to
spread the word about generic drugs, over for-profit corporations.
Thus, by taking away the respondents’ right to use PII, respondents could argue that their lost profits will fund the State’s ideological and political interests behind the regulation.
Nonetheless, even assuming the corporations’ First Amendment rights were implicated (i.e., they passed Glickman and were
thus entitled to more than rational tier review), the ultimate irony
was that Breyer, like Kennedy, applied Central Hudson anyway.97 In
fact, while both Breyer and Kennedy’s opinions suggested aversions to Central Hudson, they nonetheless applied the test instead
of abandoning it.
Still, Breyer’s reaction to Kennedy’s introduction of “content
and speaker-based” analysis bordered on contemptuous. “Until
today,” Breyer stressed, “this Court has never found that the First
Amendment prohibits the government from restricting the use of
information gathered pursuant to a regulatory mandate . . . . Nor
has this Court ever previously applied any form of ‘heightened
scrutiny’ in any even roughly similar case.”98 The absence of such
precedent within the context of commercial speech regulation,
97

Breyer found the State’s interest in protecting Vermonters’ public health and the
privacy of its physicians to be important. See Sorrell, 131 S. Ct. at 2681. He then argued
that the Act “directly advanced” each of these interests by discouraging direct marketing
techniques, which did nothing but encourage a particular doctor to buy a certain drug
without comparing the drug to more beneficial and cost-effective generic drugs. Id. at
2682. He also cited expert testimony suggesting that drug companies manipulated data
mining to “cover up information that is not in the best of light of their drug and to
highlight information that makes them look good.” Id. With respect to a narrow tailoring,
Breyer argues that the entire statute is in effect an “opt-in” provision—meaning, there is
no burden on speech whatsoever so long as a doctor consents to having his name being a
part of a PII list. Id. So in effect it is already narrowly tailored. Breyer further rejects the
respondents’ contention that simply informing physicians that their information could be
used for marketing purposes would be a less restrictive alternative by stressing that this
would not achieve Vermont’s interests in creating a “fair balance” of information in
pharmaceutical marketing sought by Vermont. Id. at 2684.
98
Id. at 2677.
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Breyer argued, is understandable: “regulatory programs necessarily
draw distinctions on the basis of content.”99 The dissent argued
that any standard evaluating such regulations on a “heightened
scrutiny” basis was “danger[ous],” threatening to unravel “widely
accepted regulatory activity.”100 It further criticized Kennedy’s
umbrage with the Act “targeting” pharmacies and pharmaceutical
companies as somehow violating the First Amendment.101 To
Breyer, the “targeting” of a particular industry was, first and foremost, a legislative act that was owed legislative deference.102 To
subject such “targeting” in the name of public health to a level of
“heightened scrutiny” would bestow upon courts a power unseen
since “a happily bygone era when judges scrutinized legislation for
its interference with economic liberty.”103 By the end of his dissent, Breyer flatly accuses the majority of resurrecting Lochner-era
substantive due process jurisprudence:

99

Id. (emphasis added) (“If there is a kind of commercial speech that lacks all First
Amendment protection, . . . it must be distinguished by its content.” (citing Va. State Bd.
of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 762 (1976))). For
example, Breyer cites “electricity regulators” who regulate “company statements,
pronouncements, and proposals, but only about electricity. The Federal Reserve Board
that regulates the content of statements, advertising, loan proposals, and interest rate
disclosures, but only when made by financial institutions. And the FDA oversees the form
and content of labeling, advertising, and sales proposals of drugs, but not of furniture.”
Sorrel, 131 S. Ct at 2677.
100
Sorrel, 131 S. Ct. at 2676–77 (“The ease with which one can point to actual or
hypothetical examples with potentially adverse speech-related effects at least roughly
comparable to those at issue here indicates the danger of applying a ‘heightened’ or
‘intermediate’ standard of First Amendment review where typical regulatory actions
affect commercial speech (say, by withholding information that a commercial speaker
might use to shape the content of a message).”).
101
Id. (“Nothing in Vermont’s statute undermines the ability of persons opposing the
State’s policies to . . . .pursue a different set of policy objectives through the democratic
process. Whether Vermont’s regulatory state “targets” drug companies (as opposed to
affecting them unintentionally) must be beside the First Amendment point.”).
102
Id. (“The related statutes, regulations, programs, and initiatives almost always
reflect a point of view, for example, of the Congress and the administration that enacted
them and ultimately the voters. And they often aim at, and target, particular firms that
engage in practices about the merits of which the Government and the firms may
disagree.” (citing H.R. DOC. NO. 75-225, at 4 (1937), request from President Franklin
Roosevelt for legislation to ease the plight of factory workers)).
103
Id. (“History shows that the power was much abused and resulted in the
constitutionalization of economic theories preferred by individual jurists.”).
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At best the Court opens a Pandora’s Box of First
Amendment challenges to many ordinary regulatory practices that only incidentally affect a commercial message . . . At worst, it reawakens Lochner’s pre-New deal threat of substituting judicial for
democratic decisionmaking where ordinary economic regulation is at issue.104
D. How Have Public Health Regulations Actually Fared Under
Sorrell?
So far, there seems to be a consensus among lower courts that
Sorrell did not impose a strict scrutiny standard, insofar as the
Court was not clear in establishing whether “heightened judicial
scrutiny” made a content or speaker-based commercial speech
regulation presumptively invalid.105 The Fourth Circuit, in striking
down a regulation banning advertisements of alcohol in college
newspapers, read Sorrell to establish a tiered approach: only if the
regulation passes Central Hudson will it need to be tested for content and speaker discrimination under “heightened judicial scrutiny,” and the reason the latter standard was not tested in Sorrell is
because Vermont failed Central Hudson.106 The Ninth Circuit fol104

Id. at 2685.
See, e.g., R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. FDA, 696 F.3d 1205, 1226 n.4 (D.C. Cir.
2012) (“Notwithstanding any intimations it may have made in cases such as Sorrell v.
IMS Health Inc., the Supreme Court has continued to apply the more deferential
framework of Central Hudson to commercial speech restrictions.” (citations omitted));
N.J. Dep’t of Labor & Workforce Development v. Crest Ultrasonics, 82 A.3d 258, 268
(N.J. App. Div. 2014) (refusing to apply strict scrutiny to, and upholding, fine for
violation of statute prohibiting employer from publishing an advertisement stating that a
job applicant must be currently employed in order for application to be considered); King
v. Gen. Info. Servs., Inc., 903 F. Supp. 2d 303, 308 (E.D. Pa. 2012) (affirming
intermediate scrutiny analysis under Sorrell) (“By the Court declaring that ‘the outcome
is the same’ whether a special commercial speech inquiry or a stricter form of judicial
scrutiny (strict scrutiny) is applied, GIS asserts that Sorrell marks a substantial shift in the
protection afforded to commercial speech and, consequently, overhauls the wellembedded Central Hudson test. This Court disagrees.”).
106
See Educ. Media Co. at Va. Tech v. Insley, 731 F.3d 291, 297–98 (4th Cir. 2013)
(“The College Newspapers . . . argue that, like the regulation at issue in Sorrell, the
challenged regulation here involves both content-based and speaker-based discrimination.
Based on this alleged discrimination, the College Newspapers argue that strict scrutiny
applies. However, like the Court in Sorrell, we need not determine whether strict scrutiny
105
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lowed suit, striking down under Central Hudson’s fourth prong a
statutory provision prohibiting day laborers from soliciting employment in the streets for public safety reasons.107 The Second
Circuit held, in striking down FDA regulations prohibiting truthful
off-label promotion of pharmaceuticals, that content and speakerbased regulations were presumptively invalid under Sorrell, but that
the regulation needed to be evaluated under Central Hudson regardless.108 Judge Chin hinted that Central Hudson was not a threshold to the “heightened judicial scrutiny” standard, but just the
opposite: a way for the government to overcome the presumptive
invalidity of a content-or speaker-based regulation.109 Almost none
of the post-Sorrell challenges to public health regulations have both
passed Central Hudson and failed “heightened judicial scrutiny,”
or vice versa. In fact, in consonance with the Court’s already stringent (some say hostile) 110 evaluation of governmental infringement
on commercial speech, circuit courts interpreting Sorrell have
mostly struck down the challenged regulation under Central Hudson regardless.111 The one exception recently came from the Eighth
Circuit, which, amidst a rather complicated set of facts,112 upheld a
Minnesota statute restricting advertising that targets car accident
victims. The Otto court held that while various parts of the statute
applied both speaker-and-content-based restrictions on commercial

is applicable here, given that, as detailed below, we too hold that the challenged regulation
fails under intermediate scrutiny set forth Central Hudson.”).
107
Valle Del Sol, Inc. v. Whiting, 709 F.3d 808, 829 (9th Cir. 2013) (“Whether Sorrell
intended to make the commercial speech test more exacting for the state to meet is a
question that we need not decide, because we conclude plaintiffs are likely to succeed
even under Central Hudson’s formulation of the standard and our cases interpreting it.”).
108
See generally United States v. Caronia, 703 F.3d 149 (2d Cir. 2012).
109
See id. (“To determine whether a government regulation unconstitutionally restricts
speech, courts engage in a two–step inquiry, first considering whether the regulation
restricting speech was content- and speaker-based, so that it is subject to heightened
scrutiny and is presumptively invalid, and then considering whether the government has
shown that the restriction on speech was consistent with the First Amendment under the
applicable level of heightened scrutiny.”).
110
See Pomeranz, supra note 2.
111
See, e.g., supra notes 105–08.
112
See 1-800-411-Pain Referral Serv., LLC v. Otto, 744 F.3d 1045 (8th Cir. 2014)
(upholding a Minnesota statute mandating that advertising for medical treatment eligible
for coverage under the state’s no-fault auto insurance statute be undertaken only by, or at
the direction of, a healthcare provider).
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speech, the ads in question were misleading.113 Because Central
Hudson explicitly denies constitutional protection for speech that
concerns unlawful activity or is “inherently misleading,” the statute was upheld.114
III. THE AFTERMATH: WHAT DOES SORRELL MEAN FOR
FUTURE PUBLIC HEALTH REGULATION?
Is Sorrell a narrow decision chiding a liberal Vermont legislature gone awry, or a de facto establishment of a strict scrutiny standard for commercial speech regulation? The controversy may lie
within the liberal–conservative disconnect behind the actual definition of “commercial speech.” Justice Breyer sees the Court using
the precept of “commercial speech” as a potential end-run around
Carolene Products and its progeny115—a laissez-faire Court striking
down perfectly reasonable regulation of ordinary transactions.116
Justice Kennedy disagrees, pointing to the Vermont legislature’s
113

See id. at 1055–58. One of the plaintiffs’ advertisements promised a possible
entitlement of “up to $40,000 in injury and lost wage benefits,” which the court found
inherently misleading to consumers because it implied that consumers would receive a
“floor” of benefits, potentially up to $40,000, when many could in fact receive nothing.
Id. (citing 1-800-411-Pain Referral Serv., LLC v. Tollefson, 915 F. Supp. 2d 1032, 1051-52
(D. Minn. 2012)). Other advertising (hiring paid actors to appear as cops) also implied an
endorsement of 411-Pain by law enforcement, which was also inherently misleading, even
though there was a disclaimer in the advertisement that the “cop” was a paid actor.
114
“Inherently misleading” speech is speech that “inevitably will be misleading” to
consumers. See Otto, 744 F.3d. at 1056 (citing Bates v. State Bar of Ariz., 433 U.S. 350,
372 (1977)).
115
See supra text accompanying note 80. The “end” run is merely using one
amendment (the First) instead of another (the Fourteenth) to achieve the same result,
which is to strike down the regulation of ordinary commercial transactions on a stricter
level of review (“intermediate” or “strict” instead of “rational”) than is warranted.
116
Cf. Erin E. Bennett, Central Hudson Plus: Why Off-Label Pharmaceutical Speech Will
Find Its Voice, 49 HOUS. L. REV. 459, 460 (2012) (“[D]oes speech that would be fully
protected as scientific and/or educational speech become transformed into commercial
speech, with its reduced level of protection, by the mere fact that a commercial entity
seeks to distribute it in order to increase its sales of the product addressed in the
speech?”). This question gets at the heart of why Breyer and Kennedy see the question at
hand so differently: in Breyer’s mind, this is a perfectly reasonable regulation of an
economic transaction. To Kennedy, this is the government preventing a company from
educating physicians simply because they don’t like the outcome.
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explicit purpose behind the Act,117 which was to interfere with the
manufacturers’ marketing efforts.118 How, Kennedy wonders, is
Act 80’s complete ban on drug manufacturers’ ability to effectively
advertise “incidental” to the infringement of commercial
speech?119 Richard Samp is not impressed by Breyer’s reaction to
Vermont’s pharmaceutical “targeting” as simply being “beside
the First Amendment point.”120 Further, Breyer’s urging of Glickman-type rational basis analysis seemed to repudiate Central Hudson and its progeny altogether, perhaps harking back for the doctrine of Chrestensen, when commercial speech essentially equaled
non-speech.121 Yet Samp seemed dissatisfied with the majority opinion as well, noting that its application of both “heightened judicial
scrutiny” and Central Hudson left open challenges to public health
regulation without a clear standard of analysis.122
How will Sorrell affect future regulation of commercial speech?
For one, until the Court considers a similar regulation, there is
bound to be a bifurcation of analyses in the lower courts, first analyzing whether a regulation is content- or speaker-based, and then
whether that regulation passes Central Hudson (or vice versa).123 It

117
A possible analogy could be made to the upcoming battle over gay marriage rights.
See Adam Liptak, Opinion May Pose Obstacle for Same Sex Unions, N.Y. TIMES, July 28,
2014, http://www.nytimes.com/2014/07/29/us/politics/ruling-poses-potential-obstacleat-supreme-court-for-same-sex-marriage.html. As Liptak stresses, Justice Kennedy
seemed to be swayed in the Windsor decision by evidence of Congress’s animus towards
homosexuality in its passing of the Defense of Marriage Act. Id. A similarly
discriminatory purpose could have offended Kennedy in Act 80.
118
See Sorrell v. IMS Health, Inc., 131 S. Ct. 2653, 2663 (2011) (reciting the legislative
history behind Act 80).
119
Id. at 2680 (“The statute threatens only modest harm to commercial speech.”).
120
Samp, supra note 55, at 147 (noting that this assertion was made without support or
citation to case law).
121
Id. (“It is difficult to see how any of the Court’s commercial speech decisions could
have been decided in favor of those challenging government speech regulations if the
Court had applied Justice Breyer’s relaxed standard of review.”) Samp adds that because
Breyer and Ginsburg had dissented in major commercial speech cases like Thompson and
Lolliard, their distaste for the majority’s opinion and Central Hudson itself is not
surprising. Id. at 148.
122
Id.
123
See, e.g., Educ. Media Co. at Va. Tech v. Insley, 731 F.3d 291, 297–98 (4th Cir. 2013)
(testing Central Hudson without even applying or testing content or speaker basis);
United States v. Caronia, 703 F.3d 149 (2d Cir. 2012) (striking down an FDA regulation
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is not entirely clear from Kennedy’s opinion whether a public
health regulation is presumptively invalidated once shown to be
speaker- and content-based, or even whether the “heightened”
standard is harsher or more intense than Central Hudson. Both
Kennedy and Breyer seem to think that this is the case, but Kennedy mentions that the outcome in Sorrell would have been the same
under either standard.124 Similar outcomes don’t necessarily imply
that the tests are similar in their evaluative rigor. Still, Kennedy’s
application of Central Hudson may have been a signal to lower
courts that a content or speaker-based commercial speech regulation was not presumptively invalid under the new heightened scrutiny standard. Though, judging by the application (or lack thereof)
of Sorrell by the circuit courts, this interpretation seems unlikely.
Lyle Denniston, reading the ruling narrowly,125 believes that the
acrimony of Breyer’s dissent is unwarranted due to Kennedy’s
suggestion that had Vermont just been “less aggressive (and less
candid) in declaring its commitment to reducing the sales of pharmaceutical companies,” the law may have survived.126
Others, however, believe Sorrell could have far-reaching consequences.127 Professor Tamara Piety contemptuously compares the
prohibiting truthful promotion of off-label drug use as both content and speaker-based,
then under the third and fourth prongs of Central Hudson).
124
See supra note 66.
125
Lyle Denniston, Opinion Analysis: Like Ships Passing in the Night . . . , SCOTUSBLOG
(June 23, 2011, 5:14 PM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2011/06/opinion-analysis-likeships-passing-in-the-night/ (“If the soaring language is put aside, what might be
concluded about what emerged on Thursday is, basically, a decision that Vermont simply
botched the job of promoting the availability of cheaper, generic drugs by overreaching.”).
126
Id.
127
See, e.g., Piety, supra note 36, at 4, 50 (“What is most at risk is the government’s
ability to regulate fraud because the strict scrutiny standard of review is often said to be
strict in theory and fatal in fact.”) (internal quotations omitted); Ashutosh Bhagwat,
Sorrell v. IMS Health: Details, Detailing, and the Death of Privacy, 36 VT. L. REV. 855, 856
(2011) (arguing that this decision may bring about troubling implications for state
enforcement of privacy); Andrew J. Wolf, Detailing Commercial Speech: What
Pharmaceutical Marketing Reveals About Bans on Commercial Speech, 21 WM. & MARY BILL
RTS. J. 1291, 1291 (2013) (“Sorrell pushes the commercial speech doctrine ever closer to
that used to analyze noncommercial speech.”). Another possible legislative solution
would have been for Vermont to simply close the “loophole” excepting “counterdetailers” from having an unfair advantage in using PII. This fix could have neutralized
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majority opinion in Sorrell to Citizens United,128 where the Court
used similar “anti discrimination rhetoric”129 in striking down public welfare regulation detrimental to large corporations.130 Jennifer
Pomeranz points out that the last commercial speech case in which
the Court ruled for the government, Fla. Bar v. Went For It, Inc.,131
may not be upheld under Sorrell because the statute at issue, barring attorneys from advertising to accident victims within 30 days
of the accident, is both content- and speaker-based.132
A. Court Majority’s Business-Friendly Ideology Pushes Standard
Towards Strict Scrutiny
Professor Pomeranz also seems to suggests that because the
ideological makeup of the Court today is much more business and
corporate friendly133 than it was even a decade before Sorrell was
handed down, Central Hudson’s fourth prong on its own might be
enough to lift the commercial speech doctrine to a strict scrutiny
standard.134 She may be onto something,135 for when it comes to
the contention that the State preferred its policy objectives over First Amendment
concerns.
128
Citizens United v. Fed. Elction Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310 (2010).
129
See Piety, supra note 36, at 4 (“[T]reating global pharmaceutical companies as if they
were embattled, under-represented minorities risks trivializing the real life-and-death
struggles of plaintiffs who are in fact relatively powerless and elides the Court’s exercise
of its counter-majoritarian power on behalf of the powerful.”).
130
Id. (arguing that the Court views corporations as “legitimate rights holders” and
participants in the political process, and that Citizens United influenced the Court’s
interpretation of the commercial speech doctrine “in a way that turned that doctrine on
its head”).
131
515 U.S. 618 (1995). Not surprisingly, Breyer was in the majority in upholding the
regulation, while Kennedy wrote the dissent.
132
Pomeranz, supra note 2, at 423–24.
133
See Liptak, supra note 10.
134
Pomeranz, supra note 2, at 431–32 (discussing the holding of Massachusetts’ antitobacco regulations in Lorilland, Pomeranz says: “One has to wonder if a five-hundredfoot radius would have sufficed in 2001, or if one hundred feet would have passed in
2011.”); see also Post, supra note 27, on Central Hudson’s fourth prong: (“This last
requirement is so arbitrary that it constitutes an open invitation for judges to bring
political prejudices to bear in resolving cases. Antiregulatory judges will tend to strike
down statutes on the basis of this requirement; proregulatory judges will tend to uphold
them.”).
135
See generally, Adam Liptak, For Justices, Free Speech Often Means ‘Speech I Agree
With’, N.Y. TIMES, May 5, 2014, http://www.nytimes.com/2014/05/06/us/politics/injustices-votes-free-speech-often-means-speech-i-agree-with.html (“[T]he votes of both
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First Amendment jurisprudence, jurists of liberal and conservative
ideologies tend to encompass entirely separate universes. It is in
fact not uncommon for a liberal and conservative judge to look at
the same set of facts, yet apply completely opposite legal standards
to evaluate those facts.136 This ideological divide persists when the
Court evaluates public health regulation of commercial speech, and
Sorrell nicely exemplifies this divide. Justice Kennedy, pointing to
Vermont’s preference for nonprofit organizations using the very
marketing techniques it prohibits for-profit corporations from using, believes that the law is a clear violation of these companies’
commercial speech rights. On the other hand, Justice Breyer is
convinced that the case is not about “speech” at all, but a run-ofthe-mill privacy and public health regulation restricting large corporations from sharing allegedly unauthorized, private data. How is
it that two veteran judges can evaluate the same statute, with one
claiming that it’s a blatant First Amendment violation, and the
other asserting that it barely concerns the First Amendment at all?
Somewhat paradoxically, it seems that both Kennedy and Breyer intensely dislike Central Hudson, and, like Robert Post,137 believe
the test is unwieldy and subject to the whims of individual judges.
In his heart, Kennedy probably wants to get rid of Central Hudson
(which has been a strict scrutiny standard all but in name only) and
elevate commercial speech to the high tier, but he didn’t know how
to do it without overturning an entire doctrine of law. Breyer also
probably wants to get rid of Central Hudson, and instead instill
liberal and conservative justices tend to reflect their preferences toward the ideological
groupings of the speaker.”).
136
See, e.g., Herceg v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 814 F.2d 1017, 1025 (5th Cir. 1987)
(granting motion for summary judgment on First Amendment grounds to defendant
magazine for publishing an article titled “Orgasm of Death” on autoerotic asphyxiation
which inspired a child to unintentionally commit suicide). The dissenter, conservative
Edith Hollis Jones, believed this article to constitute “pornography,” and thus owed a
much lesser standard of constitutional protection. Id. See also R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul,
505 U.S. 377 (1992) (striking down ordinance banning, among other things, burning
crosses). Here, the liberal justices believed that the ordinance was over-inclusive because
it seemed to ban abstract speech otherwise protected by the First Amendment. Scalia and
some of the conservatives, however, believed the ordinance to be under-inclusive for
failing to protect against certain type of speech (anti-conservative speech). The
conservatives thus deemed the fighting words statute at issue not content-neutral. See id.
137
See supra notes 27, 36.
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Glickman or perhaps even Chrestensen. This would also be a radical
change from a lot of established precedent. Regardless, until the
Court clarifies the exact weight behind “heightened judicial scrutiny,” the standard of review will continue to be, for better or worse,
Central Hudson.
CONCLUSION
First Amendment challenges to the regulation of business advertising have been adjudicated for many decades. The debate has
not, notably, fallen on predictably ideological lines, with conservatives urging full protection for corporate or business speech and
liberals protecting government regulation thereof.138 This dynamic
has only been a relatively recent phenomenon, when the Court began to take an increasingly hostile view of such regulation.139 As
stressed earlier, the Court has not upheld a regulation of business
advertising for almost two decades.140 The Court’s suspicion of
governmental regulation of commercial speech could very well be
attributed to a more business-friendly ideology shared by a majority
of the Justices.141
Yet the Sorrell Court was nonetheless not ready to give commercial speech the same level of protection given to personal
speech. This Note does not address the wisdom of such a transformation, but merely to stress that if the court wishes to depart
from Central Hudson, it should say so explicitly. Assigning no value
to a new standard of analysis can confuse the lower courts, turning
lower court judges into amateur prognosticators of what an ambiguous standard meant, instead of letting them to apply clear standards of law to the facts at hand.
Until the Court speaks more clearly, it would probably be best
for courts to continue to judge commercial speech challenges
against the traditional Central Hudson model, while taking into account the heightened scrutiny analysis outlined in Sorrell. A regulation’s speaker or content-based discrimination should not in itself
138
139
140
141

See supra note 83 and accompanying text.
See supra note 36.
See supra note 26.
See supra notes 10, 135.
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invalidate the law under Sorrell, because the Sorrell court probably
would not have even bothered going through the Central Hudson
factors if the analysis ended at the speaker and content discrimination inquiry.
In the end, the status quo satisfies neither those advocating for
the expansion of commercial speech rights nor those who wish to
sensibly regulate them. With an intermediate standard of analysis,
however, the Court’s skeptical viewpoint towards commercial
speech regulation could easily shift along with the Court’s ideological makeup. This could potentially make it tempting for the current Court’s majority to consider scrapping Central Hudson, but
there has been no sign that the Court is actually willing to do so.

